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Talking Up a Storm? Using Language to Activate Adherents and 
Demobilise Detractors of European Commission Policy Frames 
Richard Thomas and Peter Turnbull 
 
ABSTRACT The linguistic premises of European policy-making often remain hidden from 
public debate and the scrutiny of social scientists, despite the fact that ‘rhetorical framing’ is a 
widely recognised strategy and frame theory has dominated the way social scientists talk 
about ideas in social movements. Our concern is how the European Commission uses the 
‘master frame’ of neo-liberalism to establish a mandate for sector-specific policies that can be 
pursued via autonomous action by the Commission and/or collective action by adherents of 
Commission policies. Using critical discourse analysis (CDA) to decode the speeches of Siim 
Kallas, former Commissioner for Transport and advocate of an open market for port services, 
we demonstrate how rhetorical framing supports a strategy designed to ‘divide-and-conquer’ 
opponents of freedom of establishment and the right to provide services in the single 
European market. 
 
KEY WORDS critical discourse analysis (CDA); European Commission strategies; EU 
policy-making; liberalisation of port transport; rhetorical framing. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Although the importance of framing in shaping public policy is well established (Daviter 
2011), only recently have systematic empirical studies examined the determinants of interest 
groups’ frame choices in European Union (EU) policy debates initiated by different 
Directorates-General (DGs) (Klüver et al. 2015), the degree of ‘frame congruence’ between 
Commission officials and either business or civil society interests (Boräng and Naurin 2015), 
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and how contextual factors (national and European) affect the types of frames adopted by 
different interest groups (Eising et al. 2015). As expected, the Commission  appears sensitive 
to political support in order to develop proposals that will survive the EU policy process. But 
instead of asking how interest groups ‘[put] into question the scope, validity or legitimacy of 
others’ arguments’ (ibid: 521), including those of Commission officials (Boräng and Naurin 
2015), we might also ask, contrariwise, how the Commission frames debates to enact 
preferred policies, especially when these are aligned to those of a self-regarding interest 
groups such as big businesses? 
 
 Our starting point is that the Commission is more than an agenda-setting institution. 
As guardian of the Treaty and an administrator of European competition law, the Commission 
can either manipulate the default condition of decision-making within the Council of 
Ministers by encouraging relevant stakeholders to reach a more acceptable compromise to the 
(neo-liberal) policies proposed by Brussels (the so-called ‘lesser evil’ strategy), or seek to 
change the preferences of individual member states by challenging the propriety of national 
regulations or the economic and social practices of particular national actors (the so-called 
‘divide-and-conquer’ strategy) (Schmidt 2000). A third strategy of ‘rhetorical framing’ is also 
identified, albeit as a ‘less aggressive’ Commission strategy (e.g. Woll 2006), but is rarely 
grounded in any theoretical framework or detailed empirical analysis. The concept of framing 
as the ‘politics of signification’ (Snow and Benford 1988: 198) is often used to understand the 
generation, diffusion and functionality of changes in public policy and the explanation of 
developments between public and private actors (e.g. Surel 2000: 496). Indeed, the policy 
frames for particular industrial sectors (e.g. civil aviation) and particular issues (e.g. gender 
equality) have been analysed (see Woll 2006; and Verloo 2007 respectively), but rarely in 
relation to how rhetorical framing supports autonomous action by the Commission via the 
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lesser evil and/or divide-and-conquer strategies. Moreover, when rhetorical framing is 
analysed in isolation or even alongside other Commission strategies it is often in the context 
of ‘creating consensus’ and ‘building unity’ (e.g. Woll 2006: 55) rather than a mechanism 
that, through purposive control over various forms of interchange, can not only ‘mobilize 
potential adherents and constituents’ but also ‘demobilize antagonists’ (Snow and Benford 
1988: 198). Of the ‘three faces of power’ (Lukes 2005), namely the capacity to prevail in 
explicit contests, the ability to determine the issues over which there will be any explicit 
contest at all, and the linguistic premises upon which the legitimacy of accounts will be 
judged, the latter is the least visible (and hence most unaccountable) form of power (Molotch 
and Boden 1985: 273). Our aim is to show how this ‘third face of power’ exercised by the 
Commission can be made transparent and accountable. 
 
Too often, the linguistic premises of European policy-making remain hidden from 
public debate and academic scrutiny (Hay and Smith 2005: 125), despite the fact that policy 
frames are typically contested. Consider, for example, the policy frame for European ports, 
where any talk of a pan-European policy has been contested since the 1970s by public port 
authorities and private port employers (Chlomoudis and Pallis 2002). More recently, when the 
Commission proposed a Directive On Market Access to Port Services (European Commission 
2001 and 2004), anticipating a compromise (‘lesser evil’) between the relevant stakeholders 
(e.g. shipping lines, shippers, public port authorities, private terminal operators and organised 
labour), overt conflict spilled over onto the streets of Brussels and Strasbourg (Turnbull 2006 
and 2010). A key factor in this policy contest, which resulted in the Directive being rejected 
twice by the European Parliament, was the absence of (institutionalised) ‘voice’ for port 
workers (a Sector Social Dialogue Committee was only recently established in 2013). Critical 
frame analysis incorporates ‘voice’ as a mechanism to consider power relationships within 
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any given policy frame (e.g. who has or should have a voice in the political debate) (Verloo 
2007) as cognitive and normative frames legitimate some groups rather than others (Surel 
2000: 499). Indeed, different roles will be attributed to different actors, with some cast(igated) 
as the ‘problem group’ while others are part of the proposed solution.  
 
 Our preferred conceptualisation of a policy frame,  elaborated in more detail shortly, is 
a collective action frame involving ‘diagnostic framing’ (problem-identification), ‘prognostic 
framing’ (proposed solutions) and ‘motivational framing’ (Benford and Snow 2000: 615). 
Our particular focus is on rhetorical (motivational) framing as a ‘call to arms’ for engaging in 
collective action. Simply put, frames constitute ‘how I see the world’ whereas rhetorical 
framing denotes ‘how I want you to see the world’, in this instance how the Commission 
seeks to legitimate its own policies and provide adherents with compelling accounts for 
engaging in collective action and for sustaining their participation. As Benford and Snow 
(2000: 620) point out, the issue is often not whether diagnostic and prognostic claims are 
factual or valid, ‘but whether their empirical referents lend themselves to being read as “real” 
indicators of the diagnostic claims’. In the European ports policy frame, even though a 
‘factual’ (albeit contested) Impact Assessment was initiated by the Commission (Van 
Hooydonk 2013; and European Commission, 2013a; cf. ETF 2013) in preparation for a new 
Regulation to establish a Framework on Market Access to Port Services and Financial 
Transparency of Ports (European Commission 2013b), the General Secretary of the European 
Sea Ports Organisation (ESPO) doubted ‘whether anyone will have the courage to act upon 
the conclusions of such an analysis’ (Verhoeven, 2011: 164). Siim Kallas demonstrated the 
Commission’s ‘courage to act’, pre-empting the Regulation by initiating infringement 
proceedings against Spain and calling port employers ‘to arms’ in various speeches delivered 
at politically opportune moments during the latest phase of EU port policy-making. 
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Employers in the port of Antwerp subsequently heeded this call. Such instrumental action will 
always ‘speak louder than words’, but ideas and discourse precede, legitimise and actuate 
policy change. While ‘talk is cheap’, it might ultimately cost some actors – in this instance 
dockworkers – their livelihood. 
 
This latest episode in the long-running debate on European ports policy provides an 
opportunity to assess ‘rhetorical framing’ as the foundation for a ‘divide-and-conquer’ 
strategy in a highly contentious context. Theoretically, we use critical discourse analysis 
(CDA) to illustrate how Commissioner Kallas used language to justify and advance pan-
European port reform. CDA enables us to ‘see through’ the argumentative or figurative 
devices, the stylistic elements, and how talk itself is arranged for maximum effect in order to 
comprehend discourse as intentional, controlled and purposeful. Empirically, we focus 
primarily on three Speeches delivered by Commissioner Kallas to different (port-specific) 
audiences. In these Speeches, what matters is not just the substantive content of ideas – 
cognitive arguments about their necessity and normative arguments about their 
appropriateness – but the interactive processes by which they are conveyed and the 
institutional context in which they are contested (Schmidt, 2007: 993). In sum, to understand 
the process, and outcomes, of any rhetorical framing strategy, what matters is not simply what 
is said, but where, when, why, by who and to whom. 
 
2. FRAMING IN ACTION 
The European Union (EU) is a liberal project, but with its complex institutional architecture, 
combined with its cultural heterogeneity, Europe constitutes a forum where various streams of 
market liberalism discourse are intertwined (Morin and Carta 2014: 119). Thus, while all 
liberal discourses accept that markets allocate resources more efficiently than states, there is 
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still a role for the state and other actors to enable and enhance market mechanisms, correct 
market failures and ensure that progressive social, environmental and other ‘non-market’ 
outcomes are protected. In effect, neo-liberalism functions as a ‘master frame’, or what 
Benford and Snow (2000: 618-19) describe as ‘a kind of master algorithm that colors and 
constrains the orientations and activities of movements’, attributable, in considerable part, to 
the Commission’s ‘strategic constructivism’ which has persuaded a heterogeneous coalition 
of political actors that ‘the market idea’ was the solution to all that was (Jabko 2006) and still 
is (Lehndorff 2012) wrong with Europe. The economic crisis has certainly coloured, but does 
not appear to have overly constrained ‘competition discourse’ within Europe (Kessler 2012). 
Indeed, neo-liberalism has proven itself remarkably resilient and is still considered by many 
policy-makers across Europe to be an expedient route out of recession (De Ville and Orbie 
2014: 157). 
 
 While ideology is a cultural resource for framing activity, the latter is an empirically 
observable activity rooted in and constituted by social interaction. Framing is strategic, 
discursive and contested (Klüver et al. 2015: 483) and as such ‘readily available for first-hand 
observation, examination, and analysis’ (Snow and Benford 2000: 59). As our interest is 
focused on collective action framing, it goes without saying that policy framing is understood 
to be deliberate, utilitarian and goal oriented. For example, the Commission might seek to 
bridge the gap between different stakeholders to build support for its policy proposals, or 
extend the frame to other issues that are of importance to potential adherents (e.g. the 
customers as well as the providers of particular services). The discursive process includes 
both articulation (i.e. the connection and alignment of events so that they hang together in a 
relatively unified and compelling fashion) and amplification (i.e. the accentuation of 
particular events, issues and beliefs as being more salient than others) (Benford and Snow 
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2000: 623; and Snow et al 1986). While amplification will invariably involve the clarification, 
invigoration, and idealisation of existing values and beliefs, as a ‘call to arms’ it may also 
involve embellishment in order to fit facts of political, social and economic relations into 
‘coherent patterns as a critique of current circumstances and a plan of action for the future’ 
(Windt, 1991: 191). 
 
 For many observers, the European project – a ‘competitive social market economy’ 
(Lisbon Treaty, art.3 (3), emphasis added) – is an oxymoron (Morin and Carta 2014: 126), 
highlighting the contested process of all policy framing within the EU. Rhetorical 
(movement) framing processes are not always under the tight control of élites, with challenges 
coming from within (e.g. contestation between different Directorates of the Commission), 
from without (e.g. member states, different business interests, trade unions, civil society 
organisations, etc.) and from the dialectic between frames and events (Benford and Snow 
2000: 625-6). In this context, the credibility of the proffered frame, and its relative salience, 
will depend on a combination of consistency, empirical validity, and the credibility of frame 
articulators (ibid: 619). For example, if the Commissioner for Transport proclaims that 
‘Europe is home to some of the best ports in the world’ (Kallas 2014: 1), how does this square 
with earlier claims that service provision in European ports ‘is riddled with inefficiencies’ 
(Kallas 2012a and 2012b), especially those attributable to restrictive labour practices that 
‘sometimes amount to a “closed shop”’ (Kallas, 2012c)? Commissioner Kallas ‘find[s] it 
surprising that these kind of practices still exist in 21st century Europe’ (ibid), thereby 
signalling the need for ‘open access’ to bring ports ‘up to date’ with the precepts of the single 
market.  
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 Of course, collective action frames need not be generally believable, but they must be 
believable to some segment of prospective or actual adherents. Put differently, there must be 
some ‘resonance’ (Benford and Snow 2000: 620). If the Commission’s strategy is to ‘divide-
and-conquer’, then teaming up with private sector actors with pronounced sector-specific 
interests becomes a potential route to changing the preferences of individual member states. 
For example, a member state might be genuinely unaware that particular sector-specific 
arrangements infringe European competition law, which creates an information asymmetry in 
favour of the Commission. However, the Commission must still ‘call adherents to arms’, 
ideally via infringement proceedings that are ultimately brought before the Court of Justice of 
the European Union (ECJ). The Commission is then able to use the binding nature of any 
legal judgements in favour of market liberalisation for its own ends (Schmidt 2000: 39). In 
other words, the Commission must mobilise at least some actors in some member states in 
favour of its preferred (pan-European) policy frame. Unlike the lesser evil strategy, divide-
and-conquer is a sequential process, because once even a minority of member states have 
incurred the costs of domestic reform, they are themselves interested in comparable 
community-wide changes (ibid: 47). 
 
 How, then, are the Commission’s objectives mobilised and maintained linguistically? 
Studying EU political speeches is not new (e.g. Erjavec et al. 2009; and Nordin 2011), 
previous work having demonstrated how discourses around globalisation and other ‘master 
frames’ have shaped policy developments (e.g. Hay and Smith 2005). We concur that 
‘cognitive and normative frames not only construct “mental maps” but also determine 
practices and behaviours’ (Surel 2000: 498). Ontologically, therefore, we differ from some 
constructivist accounts (e.g. De Ville and Orbie 2014) downplaying causality. We link 
discourse to its underlying intentions and objectives and do not allow reality construction to 
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overwhelm the structures that influence collective action frames (Reed 1997: 26). Put 
differently, while discourse ‘socially constructs’, discourse itself is also shaped by people, 
organisations and circumstances.  
 
 Any talk on European policy is always ideational and organisational, a process of 
legitimisation through ideas and procedure (Wodak and Weiss 2004). Seasoned speechmakers 
are often skilled in the art of framing, making some aspects of reality more salient at the 
expense of other aspects. Consequently, understanding political speeches demands a forensic 
analytical method such as critical discourse analysis (CDA), where language can construct a 
selective version of reality. Here, we use CDA to shed light on the collective action framing 
of DG Move, and Commissioner Kallas in particular, during the latest phase of EU ports 
policy making. 
 
3. DATA AND METHODS   
We begin our methodological explanation with a working definition of terms often used 
generically: discourse, rhetoric, frame and argument. First, we follow the analytical 
distinction between ‘discourse’ and ‘rhetoric’ proposed by Hay and Rosamond (2002: 151), 
and posit that while discourses exist independently of their use and pertain within available 
‘discursive repertoires’, rhetoric is their ‘persuasive deployment’. Frames are an organizing 
mechanism between discourse and rhetoric, as a unifying concept (Van Dijk 1977) that 
groups together discourses with some synergy. These frames are then deployed using rhetoric, 
which forms the overarching argument. Our concern is how Commissioner Kallas draws 
various discourses into a frame and then delivers them, using a range of rhetorical techniques 
to amplify and, at times, embellish his advocacy for EU port reform. Hence, we move beyond 
the ‘modest identification of discourses’ (Hay and Smith 2005: 150-1) and the observation 
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that rhetoric exists within many speech acts (Hamilton 2001). Instead, our purpose is to 
demonstrate how rhetorical framing is used deliberately and purposefully. Our approach is to 
map the ‘highly suggestive’ discourses by considering the collective action frame and the 
linguistic and rhetorical strategies employed by Commissioner Kallas and, most importantly, 
his motivations for doing so.  
 
We focus on three Speeches delivered by Commissioner Kallas during a critical 12-
month phase of European port policy making, which initially anticipated the findings of an 
Impact Assessment of potential EU port reforms (Speech 1), then subsequently amplified and 
embellished the initial findings (Speech 2) and final reports (European Commission, 2013a; 
and Van Hooydonk, 2013) of this Assessment (Speeches 3). While our sample is smaller than 
other CDA studies analysing EU policy documents (e.g. Erjavec et al. 2008; and Nordin 
2011), De Ville and Orbie (2014: 153) validate this approach for a small number of texts. In 
terms of the delivery of the speeches themselves, when addressing ESPO (Speeches 1 and 3), 
the audience was dominated by adherents of port reform (e.g. port authorities, private terminal 
operators, shippers, shipping lines and other port users). The more general audience in 
Brussels (Speech 2) was also populated by many yet to be persuaded of the benefits of pan-
European port reform (e.g. international port terminal operators in the ‘world leading’ ports of 
northern Europe) as well as (a minority of) antagonists (e.g. European Transport Workers’ 
Federation and the European Maritime Pilots’ Association). Despite their presence at the 
Conference on European Ports Policy (Brussels, 25th September 2012) convened by DG Move 
to ‘consult’ the relevant stakeholders, trade unions were afforded only limited (formal) 
opportunities to speak (during the very last session of the Conference), in stark contrast to the 
previous consultation on European ports policy (six 2-day workshops between November 
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2006 and May 2007) when an entire workshop (Valencia, 8-9th March 2007) was devoted to 
cargo handling and associated labour issues (Turnbull, 2010). 
 
Extempore elements including body language, voice intonation and facial expressions are 
clearly important within political speechmaking. Analysing transcriptions therefore misses 
visual and aural detail as well as the semiotic nature of the venue (Catalano 2011: 52). 
However, as Van Dijk (1997: 21) points out, the spoken word is ‘recorded, corrected, printed 
and possibly published or otherwise made public’, and will thereby ‘count as’ the intervention 
or position of the person and/or organisation for whom s/he speaks. Consequently, orating and 
then publishing a public policy speech is a purposeful and deliberate act of motivational 
framing. 
 
For sound analytical reasons, CDA has been described as discourse analysis ‘with 
attitude’ (Van Dijk 2001: 96), signalling that an otherwise neutral linguistic discipline has 
acquired political motivation. In particular, the emancipatory objectives of CDA make it well 
suited for decoding ideologically loaded texts (Fairclough 2001). The assumptions that inform 
neo-liberalism (e.g. open competition is ‘fair’ and will drive innovation and efficiency) are 
now ‘taken for granted’ in many quarters, but when viewed through the lens of CDA it is 
clear that the call for European ports to be more ‘open’ and ‘transparent’ will benefit some 
stakeholders (e.g. short-sea shipping lines, shippers and stevedores) and disadvantage others 
(e.g. the ‘problem groups’ who currently benefit from a ‘closed shop’). As Commission 
Kallas speaks for those standing to benefit from an open market in a way designed to 
manipulate his audience with suggestion, inference and omission, he is open to (counter) 
claims that his objectives are neither fully transparent nor entirely legitimate. If words are 
indeed ‘all he has’, such counter claims provide grounds for our (critical discourse) scrutiny. 
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Figure 1 depicts a multi-level CDA framework often used for analysing media texts, 
adapted to facilitate the examination of our sample (or indeed any other political speeches). 
The outer layer, or ‘social and cultural goings-on’ (Fairclough 1995: 57) – in this case the 
‘master frame’ of neo-liberalism – fashions the production of specific texts. Thus, any 
proposed (de)regulation of port transport can be situated within the single market discourse 
and the ‘four freedoms’, as well as similar moves in other areas of European transport such as 
road, maritime and civil aviation. The middle layer of discourse practice identifies the 
circumstances within which the text is both constructed and received, reflecting the 
institutional structures therein. Finally, the inner layer of TEXT is where we consider how 
Commissioner Kallas uses language in specific and deliberate ways in order to convince key 
stakeholders, at least in some member states, to support DG Move’s preferred and intended 
policy frame. 
*** FIGURE 1 HERE *** 
 
CDA offers a wide range of techniques for linguistic detection that we used in the 
initial (comprehensive) stage of data analysis.1 In this respect, CDA can be likened to a 
‘toolbox’ such that the process of CDA is akin to selecting the most appropriate (analytical) 
tools for the job in hand (as per van Dijk 1997). Thus, just as social actors use ‘toolkits’ to 
combine elements from the existing ideational repertoire (the outer layer in Figure 1) to create 
new meanings and powerful coalitions for collective action and change (Carstensen 2011), 
here we use a selection of linguistic techniques to demonstrate how Commissioner Kallas 
promotes his argument. More specifically, we evidence how, in the absence of a robust 
impact assessment that might establish the need for change alongside policy options that 
might work for the benefit of all stakeholders, the Commissioner seeks to manipulate his 
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audience through: (i) repetition, (ii) (de)coupling and (iii) rhetorical contrast. We analyse 
repetition  within and across speeches to demonstrate how Commissioner Kallas seeks to 
emphasise the neo-liberal agenda and then couple (decouple) this with positive (negative) 
outcomes. Rhetorical contrast then creates a sense of urgency – the idea that the industry 
stands at a critical juncture – and to build solidarity among actual and potential supporters of 
port reform1.  
 
Repetition across the three Speeches is perhaps the most immediate and striking 
feature of the Commissioner’s talk. However, in our analysis, instead of repeating examples 
from every Speech we present only one or two examples marked with a single asterisk (*) if 
there is a similar example in the other Speeches and a double asterisk (**) where a phrase is 
repeated almost verbatim. Our own aversion to repetition in no way detracts from the 
conclusion that rhetorical framing can be deployed to ‘kick start’ a divide-and-conquer 
strategy with much wider ramifications, most notably for dockworkers, especially when the 
Commission has the legitimacy, and courage, to ‘kick first’.  
 
4. TALKING UP A STORM 
4.1. Let’s Be Clear About Repetition 
Our starting point, informed by the outer layer of Figure 1, was to identify keywords 
associated with the discourse of neo-liberalism and the ‘four freedoms’. References to 
‘competitiveness’ – the ‘mantra of neo-liberalism’ and leitmotiv within European politics (De 
Ville and Orbie 2014: 152; Hay and Smith 2005) – featured heavily (six times in Speeches 1 
and 2 and once in Speech 3).2 However, the Commissioner repeatedly and consistently uses 
                                                        
1 We identify these three elements as part of what we propose is Kallas’ sequential strategy to persuade his 
audience to support and act in pursuit of port reform. These elements form part of our wider and more 
comprehensive analysis which embraces more tools from the ‘CDA toolkit’. This is full analysis is available 
online here  XXXXXXXXXXX 
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the more enigmatic concept of ‘transparency’. In the eyes of the Commission, transparency is 
a precondition for (fair) competition, and there is no alternative to an open market for port 
services on the agenda.  
 
In his former position as EU Commissioner for Administrative Affairs, Audit and 
Anti-Fraud, Siim Kallas strongly advocated transparency. In March 2005 he launched a 
(surprise) European Transparency Initiative that ‘basically used the demands, concerns and 
alarmist, not to say vehement tone of the campaigners’ (Chabanet 2007: 33) calling for 
greater transparency within the EU. However, ‘transparency’ within the new EU ports policy 
frame relates not to any (outer layer) concern about the ‘openness’ of the system of interest 
representation in the EU or any broader discussion of accountability within the general system 
of interest representation that has dominated European (master frame) discourse on 
transparency (Smismans 2014). Instead, Commissioner Kallas focuses on the (ostensibly) 
opaque regulatory environment that fails to deliver a ‘level playing field’ in European ports. 
This particular use of the transparency discourse is perhaps unsurprising as Commissioner 
Kallas was addressing actual or potential adherents (see Table 1) and therefore a one-sided 
interpretation of transparency allowed him to ‘avoid the haunting question of representation’ 
that still lies at the heart of the ‘regulatory conundrum of interest group participation’ 
(Smismans 2014: 491-2) (i.e. the fact that some interest groups, most notably labour, were 
largely excluded from much of the policy framing process). Within the three Speeches, the 
words ‘clear’, ‘clarity or ‘clarify’ are used seven, five and six times respectively, while 
‘transparent’ (or variation thereof) is used six times in each Speech. We return later to the 
emphasis on transparency, which is not simply regarded as ‘good’ in its own right but is also 
coupled with other (potential) ‘positive outcomes’ arising from pan-European port reform. 
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For now, a single example, albeit repeated in other Speeches and therefore denoted with an 
asterisk (*), illustrates the apparent need for greater clarity: 
 
making things clear3 … 
 
Speech 2: “There are no clear EU-wide rules to cover today’s varied patchwork of 
national regulations”* 
 
By featuring transparency so strongly and so often, Commissioner Kallas implicitly but 
continually reminds his audiences that current port regimes are purposefully opaque and over 
complex. Unstated, and yet clear nonetheless, is the inference that national (industry-specific) 
regulations are undesirable and should be replaced with a common standard; to do this 
national regimes must first be delegitimised as an inefficient bricolage.  It is these national 
regimes that constitute the ‘last line of defence’ for dockworkers in the face of globalisation 
(Turnbull and Wass 2007). 
 
Repetition simplifies messages by combining clarity and focus with emphasis and 
accentuation (Tannen 2007). More importantly, it is conceivable that repeating the same 
word, phrase or idea may be unconscious during ad hoc interaction, given the deliberate 
transcription process described earlier, it is evident that ‘clarity’ and ‘transparency’ is the 
binding motif within these Speeches, making the Commission’s call for ‘open access’ to 
European ports inescapable. 
                      
 For Commissioner Kallas, repetition is purposeful, deliberate, and beyond the confines 
of subtlety. Indeed, rather than any coincidental or accidental use, repetition is a central 
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linguistic meaning-making strategy, creating ‘a discourse, a relationship, and a world’ 
(Tannen 2007: 97). Furthermore, Commissioner Kallas uses repetition vertically within 
Speeches and horizontally across speeches. Some common themes and passages across his 
three Speeches are exemplified below: 
 
European ports left behind … 
 
Speech 1: “we have to ask ourselves where that growth and demand will actually leave 
our many hundreds of seaports in the next 20 years”** 
 
Here the Commissioner’s discourse suggests that without a pan-European policy, ports 
will stagnate as investors and customers ‘leave them behind’. By rhetorically asking where 
ports will be ‘left’ as a result of globalisation and technological developments (most notably 
the construction of ever larger container vessels), the Commissioner strongly suggests that 
this may be somewhere undesirable. This message will resonate with some (e.g. 
Mediterranean ports) more than others (e.g. ‘world class’ north European ports), depending 
on how opaque various practices are in the particular ports in question. Commissioner Kallas 
therefore needs only to appeal to some (potential and actual) antagonists in the audience (i.e. 
those feeling the furthest behind). These ports, and their users, must face up to forthcoming 
challenges: 
 
facing up to future challenges … 
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Speech 1: “The challenges that ports face in productivity, investment needs, 
sustainability, human resources, integration with cities and regions can in no way be 
underestimated”** 
 
The need to address such challenges is exemplar of how language manipulates using 
presuppositions (Huckin 1997); the assumptions are, first, that these challenges exist, and 
secondly that they must be addressed. Moreover, terms like ‘sustainability’ and ‘integration 
with cities and regions’ are sufficiently vague but sound more problematic and wide-ranging 
than more specific challenges, such as enticing capital to European ports: 
 
attracting investment … 
 
Speech 3: “we have to ... create a business climate to attract the investments”** 
 
Here, Commissioner Kallas appeals to a universally recognised discourse (master frame) that 
commerce cannot survive without investment. Implicitly, therefore, he suggests that investors 
will not be attracted to European seaports by ‘irregular’ or ‘non-standard’ governance (i.e. 
national variation that protects ‘vested interests’ versus pan-European consistency and 
conformity that creates ‘opportunities for all’). Once again, in pursuit of a ‘divide-and-
conquer’ strategy, Commissioner Kallas appeals to those ‘least attractive’ to investors. More 
specifically, among the audience of port authorities, terminal operators, service providers, 
shipping lines and other port users, the Commission is appealing for potential antagonists to 
‘lead the floor’, via collective action, and put paid to market restrictions by supporting a new 
pan-European policy frame:  
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market restrictions … 
 
Speech 1: “Today’s many bottlenecks are often due to low efficiency and sometimes 
to restrictive labour and other non-competitive regimes”** 
Speech 2: “some of the practices are highly restrictive and amount to what is, in effect, 
a ‘closed shop’ where service providers may not employ personnel of their own 
choice”** 
 
‘Bottlenecks’, ‘closed shops’ and other (unspecified) ‘restrictive practices’ (e.g. labour 
pools) are pejorative terms designed to isolate dockworkers as both a source of inefficiency 
and a target for reform. Thus, the clear suggestion is that ‘restrictive practices’ benefit some 
(e.g. dockworkers) but retard progress and disadvantage many others (e.g. users and 
consumers). Repeating this message resonates with the proclaimed efficiency gains from 
liberalisation now embedded in the wider economic and ideological circumstances of the EU 
(De Ville and Orbie 2014: 152), represented by the outer layer in Figure 1. In terms of 
discourse practice, these repeated messages develop the notion that unless European ports are 
‘opened up’ to competition by removing (claimed) restrictive practices, they will be unable to 
keep abreast of the new global sea freight market. To further reinforce the new ports policy 
frame, the benefits of transparency are repeatedly coupled with other values that talk to 
adherents of the Commission’s position and marginalise known opponents of an open port 
services market. 
 
4.2. You Can’t Have One Without the Other 
The linguistic technique of (de)coupling is an attempt to legitimise an organisation’s actions 
and aspirations by (dis)associating with (un)acceptable values (Meyer and Rowan 1977).  
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Rhetorical theory utilises what might be considered perfectly reasonable, common-sense 
value systems. For example, ‘transparency’ is not simply repeated to reinforce, but is joined 
to other considerations that build a more legitimate and widely acceptable message. Thus, in 
the master frame of neo-liberalism, transparency is typically presented as a precondition for 
an ‘open market’ and a ‘level playing field’ for competition. In the ports policy frame, 
transparency is coupled with other (positive) outcomes such as fairness, long-term 
investment, the simplification of rules, increased productivity and financial limpidity. All are 
intuitively desirable. Ipso facto, transparency must also be desirable. When coupled together, 
they build a (rhetorical) case for port reform in the absence of ‘hard evidence’. The following 
examples suggest that ports must change or suffer the damaging consequences: 
 
transparency plus … 
 
Speech 1: “the idea is not to create more rules. It is to standardise the different 
conditions that exist today for concessions in many Member States and to make them 
more transparent”* 
Speech 2: “it is about having greater transparency and fewer restrictions, to remove 
barriers for new entrants wanting to tender fairly and openly”** 
Speech 3: “public funding should not be used to distort port charges for using 
infrastructure, which should be set in a transparent and non-discriminatory way”** 
 
Transparency and clarity are coupled with reasonable, positive and necessary 
outcomes; most notably, it is suggested to be the antidote to discrimination. Because of the 
lexical choices of clarity/transparency, the constructed discourse is an advocacy of 
‘standardisation’, ‘open practice’ and ‘barrier reduction’ to enable free-market principles and 
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practices within European ports. Indeed, lexical selections are key in matters of representation 
and the efficacy of specific choices can be increased when combined – or coupled – with 
agreeable outcomes. Commissioner Kallas does this regularly in his three Speeches, to 
reinforce the claimed benefits of reform and clearly establishing who is ‘for’ and ‘against’. 
                 
4.3. If Not This, Then What? 
Rhetorical contrasts (Edwards and Potter 1992) are extensively used within political 
speechmaking. In the new European ports policy frame, the repetition of ‘transparency’, 
coupled with seemingly desirous outcomes, and contrasting it with negative outcomes if 
reform is not accepted, is used to build a compelling and rational case (at least for potential 
and current adherents). Commissioner Kallas establishes several contrasts within his 
overarching argument, most notably via the strategic device of ‘rationalisation’. All three 
Speeches contain examples of dichotomous outcomes, consistent with an approach where ‘the 
past is embraced in the interpretation of the present’ (Nordin 2011: 3). Thus, in the words of 
Commissioner Kallas, the past (and present) connotes restriction within port operations 
whereas the future, if grasped today, promises a transparent and liberated free-market 
essential for prosperity. Once again, this is consistent with the master frame of neo-liberal 
European discourse – the restrictions of the past versus the (four) freedoms of the future 
(Krzyżanowski 2005) – and is part of a process of ‘temporal othering’ (De Ville and Orbie 
2014: 162). For Commissioner Kallas, the past, and indeed the present, is represented as 
problematic and undesirable whereas the future is potentially prosperous: 
 
learn from yesterday, live for today, hope for tomorrow … 
 
Speech 1 (present): “Today’s many bottlenecks are often due to low efficiency”** 
 
 
21 
Speech 2 (future): “We expect, and hope for, a great deal of growth in the years 
ahead”* 
 
Using this temporal model, Commissioner Kallas not only enables audiences to 
visualise the natural denouement to deregulation, he uses ‘today’s many bottlenecks’ instead 
of alternatives such as ‘the current bottlenecks’ to introduce urgency. Those who benefit from 
the ‘embedded restrictions’ of the past, such as dockworkers, are undermined, even though 
the nature of port inefficiency remains unexplained. Instead, it is set against transparency 
through another discursive selection of the neo-liberal master frame, namely the ‘natural 
order’ of ‘free markets’, as the following example serves to illustrate: 
 
Speech 1: “it is about having greater transparency and fewer restrictions, to remove 
barriers for new entrants wanting to tender fairly and openly for port services”* 
 
The competitive threat of a ‘geographical other’ is often evident within EU discourse 
(Wodak and Weiss 2005), whether in the form of the USA in the negotiation of ‘open skies’ 
in civil aviation (Woll 2006) or the more general threat from China in the new millennium 
(De Ville and Orbie 2014: 161). Commissioner Kallas positions the competitive threat of 
‘them’ against ‘us’ as a driving factor in port liberalisation: 
 
mobilising ‘us’ by identifying ‘them’ … 
 
Speech 1: “It is also crucial if ports are to be properly efficient and compete globally 
against rival ports in North Africa or in Asia – particularly China”* 
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The use of deixis (e.g. ‘that’, ‘this’, ‘them’, and ‘us’) helps to position groups within 
power structures (Catalano 2011). Commissioner Kallas uses ‘we’ and ‘them’ to further the 
constructed notion of ‘us’ versus the collective ‘other’. ‘We’ develops group membership 
(Krzyżanowski 2005: 150) but it is often unclear to whom ‘we’ refers. Irrespective of its 
nebulous status, it is likely that Commissioner Kallas uses ‘we’ to indicate communality and 
collaboration and to provide a ‘bridge’ between different interest groups (Snow et al 1986). It 
is hard to resist the conclusion that ‘we’ is used to promote a ‘spurious solidarity’ (Fairclough 
1989: 12), as the following examples serve to illustrate: 
  
Speech 1: “we need to improve access to ports as well as raise their efficiency” 
Speech 2: “we also need to examine the issue of financial transparency” 
 
In these examples, ‘we’ is ambiguous and lacks definition. One alternative is that it 
could refer to the ‘royal we’, where ‘we’ is amplified into a ‘massive form that is soon 
merged with the entire field’ (Fontanille 2006: 64). ‘Us’ and ‘we’ develop apparent 
commonality between stakeholders, and even those disadvantaged by deregulation are swept 
along, or aside, as part of a forward movement for the proclaimed common good. In contrast, 
in the following examples, Commissioner Kallas differentiates between ‘we’ and ‘the port 
transport sector’. When used in this more specific way, and in conjunction with ‘you’, the 
pronoun ‘we’ seemingly becomes the legislature requesting the co-operation of other social 
actors making up the audience of either the ‘live’ or transcribed Speech, recognising that 
some will be ‘for’ and some will be ‘against’: 
 
Speech 1: “So how do we go forward? Firstly, we naturally want to hear your views 
and valuable input” 
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Speech 2: “we are all here today in our respective roles ... we all have our interests and 
they will not always converge” 
Speech 3: “we propose new, transparent and open procedures” 
 
Here, Commissioner Kallas’ use of ‘we’ is clearer than the polysemous notions 
outlined in much theoretical literature examining political discourse. ‘We’ for example, can 
either include or exclude ‘us’, and within his Speeches Commissioner Kallas uses ‘we’ to do 
both. Thus, despite claims that “our intention is to be light on regulation” and “we don’t want 
to impose unnecessary red tape” (Speech 3), CDA shows that ‘we’ (the legislature) is strongly 
advocating free-market principles for European ports, with the process of consultation (“we” 
ask for “your” input) perhaps masking this effect and suggesting some illusion of choice. 
Since repeated use of the inclusive ‘we’ constructs a community with common goals and 
values, by the time Commissioner Kallas uses ‘we’ more narrowly, the communal ‘we’ has 
long been established. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
In setting the agenda for EU port reform – both in terms of what is on the agenda (e.g. open 
access, transparency, etc.) and what is not (e.g. the benefits of labour pools and other ‘closed’ 
employment arrangements that ensure social protection, comprehensive training, safety and 
health, and the sharing of underemployment costs by employers) – the Commission has 
identified the problem (diagnostic framing), proposed solutions (prognostic framing) and 
sought to legitimate its own authority to act, call adherents to arms and demobilise detractors 
and opponents (motivational framing). To some, including waterfront trade unions, the 
exclusion of cargo handling from the latest Regulation on Market Access to Port Services and 
Financial Transparency of Ports (European Commission, 2013b) might be read as another 
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outright victory for organised labour, but rhetorical (motivational) framing in the latest 
contest to determine the future of EU ports policy was designed to divide-and-conquer. The 
day after the Conference on European Ports Policy in Brussels (Speech 2), the Commission 
sent a reasoned opinion to Spain (the second stage of the infringement procedure) for non-
compliance with the EU-Treaty (restrictions on freedom of establishment and the obligation 
on employers to recruit only recognised dockworkers from the Spanish labour pool). It seems 
that when Commissioner Kallas talked about the need for action ‘today’, he obviously had in 
mind ‘tomorrow’.  
 
As the Commissioner correctly anticipated, ‘we’ (i.e. the Commission and its 
supporters) were indeed “looking at a potential conflict of interest” (Speech 2) as Spanish 
trade unions were incensed at being consulted today and threatened with the demise of their 
‘closed shop’ tomorrow. But opposition, on this occasion, was national (confined to the main 
Spanish ports, albeit with ‘letters of support’ from other port unions) rather than the pan-
European disputes that proved so costly to port operators and users during the ‘war on 
Europe’s waterfront’ (Turnbull 2006) and the more widespread opposition to the subsequently 
revised Directive On Market Access to Port Services (European Commission 2004) when 
dockworkers once again coordinated action across the EU (Turnbull 2010). Following the 
ESPO Conference in Varna (Speech 3), when it was clear that cargo handling would be 
excluded from DG Move’s proposed Regulation (European Commission, 2013b), an 
employer in Antwerp made a complaint to the Commission about the ‘restrictions’ of the 
national port labour law in Belgium that likewise restricts employment to dockworkers 
registered with the port labour pool (i.e. enterprises are not free to hire labour of their own 
choice). Following industrial action against the employer in question in March 2014, on this 
occasion confined to port of Antwerp rather than concerted national action or coordinated 
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European action, the Commission sent a notice to Belgium (April 2014) on alleged 
infringements of the rules of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, marking 
the first step towards the opening of an infringement procedure. In December 2014 the ECJ 
ruled that Spain had indeed breached EU rules on freedom of establishment with regard to the 
rules on hiring port labour. The ETF expects this ruling to “spread like a cancer” to other 
European ports in the Mediterranean (most notably Italy and Greece) and possibly even some 
ports in northern Europe (e.g. Hamburg).2 Commissioner Kallas has evidently ‘talked up a 
storm’ in European ports. 
 
Although it is widely accepted that discourses play a powerful causal role in 
determining the ideational structures and norms of political debate within the EU (Hay and 
Rosamond 2002) as well as the trajectory of policy change (Hay and Smith 2005), such that 
discourses are now treated as objects of enquiry in their own right, much of this analysis has 
focused on the ‘master frames’ of liberalisation and globalisation (the outer layer of Figure 1) 
and has less often considered how rhetorical framing might support policy framing and 
collective action by European actors at the sectoral level. This is especially important when 
the Commission is seeking to ‘divide-and-conquer’ because any collective action framing 
must function both as a mechanism to legitimate action on its own part and to persuade actual 
or potential adherents to engage in (collective) action in support of the Commission’s 
preferred (pan-European) policy. Rhetorical framing will therefore pre-empt and help to 
sustain collective action by the Commission and adherents of Commission policies. By 
legitimating some groups rather than others, the strategy of rhetorical framing is not only a 
‘call to arms’ but a ‘delineation of the battle lines’ that determine the issues over which there 
will be any explicit contest. By considering text in its political context, CDA is able to decode 
                                                        
2 Interview with EFT Dockers’ Section Political Secretary, April 2015. 
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the messages sent by the Commission or indeed any political actor to its intended audience. If 
the text is made transparent, and the speaker is held to account, we can reveal how discursive 
repertoires become rhetorical strategies and the role these strategies play in policy framing, 
collective action and subsequent policy decisions that benefit some and disadvantage others. 
 
Biographical notes: Richard Thomas is a doctoral researcher at Cardiff University. Peter 
Turnbull is Professor of Management at the University of Bristol. 
 
Address for Correspondence: Peter Turnbull, School of Economics, Finance & 
Management, University of Bristol, Priory Road Complex, Bristol BS8 1TU.  
email: peter.turnbull@bristol.ac.uk  
 
NOTES 
1 Detailed analysis is available from the authors on request. 
2 For expediency, in our analysis we refer to the three speeches listed in Table 1 as Speech 1 
(Kallas 2012a), Speech 2 (Kallas 2012b) and Speech 3 (Kallas 2013). 
3 All text highlighted with italic in the three Speeches is our emphasis. 
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 Figure 1 Analytical framework for CDA 
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